Research

Overview

My research studies how institutional and technological constraints shape access to markets, economic allocation, and long-run innovation. Across contexts—including infrastructure adoption, labor mobility, education technology, and digital platform governance—I examine how frictions and regulatory design influence participation, entry, and welfare.

My work combines applied microeconomics, quantitative modeling, and institutional analysis to study how rules governing access (e.g., to electricity, mobility, skills, or digital markets) affect economic opportunity and development.

Publications

Why is household electricity uptake low in Sub-Saharan Africa? [Download]

with Moussa P. Blimpo and Agnieszka Postepska

World Development, Volume 133, 2020.

Technology in the Classroom and Learning in Secondary Schools. [Download]

with Moussa P. Blimpo, Ousman Gajigo, Solomon Owusu, and Ryoko Tomita

Policy Research Working Paper No. 9288. World Bank, Washington, DC. 2020.

This paper evaluates the impact of a computer-assisted learning program implemented in secondary schools in The Gambia. The program introduced technology-enhanced teaching methods in mathematics and science, aiming to improve foundational competencies and exam performance. Because participating schools were not randomly selected, we construct a credible counterfactual using administrative and survey data and implement a pre-analysis plan prior to observing high-stakes certification outcomes. Using certification exam data, we find that the program increased mathematics scores by 0.59 standard deviations and raised the share of students obtaining credit—required for college admission—by 15 percentage points. The results provide evidence on the effectiveness of technology-enabled instruction in low-income settings and contribute to the literature on human capital formation and education technology in developing economies.

Current Research

I. Institutional Frictions, Mobility, and Spatial Growth

Internal Migration Restrictions, Aggregate Productivity, and Spatial Growth [Download]

(Job Market Paper)

This paper develops a dynamic spatial general equilibrium model to quantify the aggregate consequences of migration restrictions under China’s hukou system. The model incorporates trade linkages, agglomeration effects, endogenous amenities, and migration costs that differ by registration status. Using prefecture-level panel data, I estimate structural parameters governing migration elasticity, productivity dynamics, and amenity formation. Counterfactual simulations evaluate how relaxing hukou restrictions would reallocate labor across regions, affect regional inequality, and influence aggregate productivity. The paper contributes to the literature on spatial misallocation, internal migration, and institutional barriers to economic efficiency, offering quantitative evidence on how mobility restrictions distort long-run growth.

Who Moves and Who Benefits? Simulated Effects of Hukou Reform After 100 Years

High-Speed Rail: Impacts on Mobility Costs and Spatial Reallocation

(Work in Progress)

This project extends my spatial framework to study how reductions in transportation costs interact with institutional migration frictions. By modeling high-speed rail expansion as a decline in trade and commuting costs, I examine how infrastructure reshapes regional specialization, labor allocation, and productivity dynamics. The analysis highlights how transportation investment can partially offset institutional barriers, but also how its effects depend critically on the underlying migration regime. The project contributes to understanding the interaction between infrastructure policy and institutional constraints in shaping spatial equilibrium outcomes.

II. Human Capital and Digital Transformation

Digital Skills and Labor Market Demand in Central Asia

(Working Paper)

This project examines the emergence of digital skills as a new dimension of labor market demand in transition economies. Using employer surveys, wage data, and skill assessments, the paper studies how digital competencies affect employment probabilities, wage premia, and mismatch patterns. The analysis documents a growing digital skill premium and identifies structural gaps in training systems that limit workers’ ability to adapt to technological change. The paper contributes to the literature on skill-biased technological change and labor market adjustment in developing and middle-income countries.

Digital Skills for Lifelong Learning (DS4LL), Kyrgyzstan

(Policy Paper)

This large-scale impact evaluation assesses the effects of digital-skills interventions across approximately 300 secondary schools. The study combines structured digital competency assessments for students and teachers with program implementation data to evaluate learning gains and institutional capacity building. The project provides evidence on how curriculum reform, teacher training, and technology integration affect digital readiness and long-term labor market preparedness. The findings inform education policy in emerging economies undergoing digital transformation.

III. Platform Governance, Contestability, and Innovation

From Market Opening to Innovation: Effective Contestability in Digital Markets [Download]

(Working Paper)

Opening a digital market can be enough for entry—but not enough for innovation.

When do access-oriented competition policies create meaningful competition? I develop a two-period stochastic general-equilibrium model in which effective contestability determines whether a challenger can reach users and scale, while commercial scale determines whether innovation is profitable. Calibrated to EU iOS app distribution, the model shows that post-DMA access crosses the entry threshold but leaves the challenger with only 2 percent of digital expenditure. In the benchmark, challenger innovation remains unprofitable even at full contestability; it emerges only when stronger access is paired with greater innovation capability. Greater contestability can also sustain platform innovation and raise welfare through downstream production.

Observed post-regulation (DMA) contestability is sufficient to support challenger entry, but not benchmark challenger innovation. With greater innovation capability, challenger R&D activates only after a second, higher threshold. Effective access and challenger capability are therefore complements.

Beyond Market Concentration: Measuring Contestability in Digital Markets [Download]

with Zhiyang Cheng and Amr Yakout
Working paper, July 2026

How can we tell whether a dominant digital platform can actually be challenged?

This paper develops a framework for measuring digital-market contestability as competitive opportunity, rather than market concentration or observed outcomes. We organize contestability around four channels: user mobility, rival access and distribution, platform neutrality, and access to data, interoperability, and infrastructure.

The framework separately measures De Jure Contestability—the formal legal protections supporting competitive challenge—and De Facto Contestability—whether those opportunities are realized in practice. We implement the framework using 144 legal assessments across nine jurisdictions and pilot applications to Google Search, Apple’s iOS/App Store ecosystem, and Google Android/Google Play.

The results reveal substantial gaps between formal protections and realized market conditions. They also show that the barriers limiting contestability differ across markets: app distribution responds more visibly when categorical platform restrictions are removed, while search remains constrained by infrastructure, accumulated data, distribution advantages, and ranking conduct.

Comments on the First Review of the Digital Markets Act [Download]

(Yale Tobin Center for Economic Policy)

This policy-oriented analysis evaluates early evidence from the DMA’s implementation phase, focusing on contestability outcomes, compliance challenges, and innovation incentives. The piece connects practical enforcement developments with broader economic questions about market access, entry conditions, and the distribution of rents in platform ecosystems.

Blueprint for a Technical Committee in U.S. v. Google (Search) [Download]

This paper proposes an institutional design for a Technical Committee to oversee remedy implementation in United States v. Google LLC. Drawing on the Microsoft remedy and recent regulatory experience, it outlines the authority, technical access, and monitoring procedures required to address information asymmetries and ensure effective enforcement in dynamic digital markets. The paper conceptualizes enforcement architecture as an economic mechanism that shapes firm incentives and the effectiveness of competition remedies.